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Our aim is to clarify the conceptual foundations of the philosophical research program variously
referred to by the names ‘epistemic decision theory’ and ‘epistemic consequentialism’. This has been
done before,1 but we think there’s profit in doing it again. In particular, we will argue that there are
in fact two different projects rather than one, and only confusion can come from conflating them.
We’ll show that the nearly universally held norm we’ll call Propriety cannot be true, at least not as a
part of epistemic decision theory as we think that project ought to be understood. Since so many
results in this burgeoning literature depend on that norm, our aim is unfortunately also destructive.
As we’ll argue, though, we should have been suspicious all along of the high-powered results that
allegedly purely (epistemic) decision-theoretic principles have seemed to deliver. In addition to
conceptual clarity, we think that this investigation will also illuminate the substantive normative
foundations of any project like epistemic decision theory.
We’ll first introduce the essential terminology and conceptual apparatus we and others use. Then
we’ll examine the main argument in the literature for a requirement related to Propriety, which we’ll
call Immodesty. That argument is Lewis (1971)’s Consumer Reports analogy. We then show how,
given the strongest requirement that that argument can support, extant arguments from Immodesty
to Propriety fail. We then give positive reason to doubt Propriety. We conclude by returning to
the issue of whether or not the loss of interesting and compelling results proved using Propriety
should itself cast doubt on what we say; to the contrary, we argue, once you take seriously the
*Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies. Thanks to Sara Aronowitz, Sarah Moss, Cat Saint Croix, Eric Swanson, and
especially Boris Babic and Jim Joyce for helpful feedback.
†Equal contribution; listed alphabetically.
1We will mention a few directly as we go, but see also, e.g., Carr (forthcoming) and Schoenfield (2015) for further
discussion.
1
difference between decision theory and ethics, a similar divide between epistemic decision theory
and epistemology reveals itself as an attractive way to regard these projects. We should expect
epistemic decision theory not to be as substantive as epistemology.
1 Preliminaries and Lewis’s Argument
In this section, we’ll explain what we take epistemic decision theory to be, and then we’ll explicitly
formulate the best versions of those claims, specifically in ways that are sensitive to the best ways of
arguing for those claims.
First, we’ll introduce the jargon. A credence function Cr is a function from propositions p in an
algebra Ω, closed under complementation and intersection, to real numbers in the interval [0, 1].
For simplicity’s sake, we’ll assume thatΩ = P(W ), whereW is the set of possible worlds. We’ll also
assume, unrealistically, thatW is finite. Intuitively, if Cr(p) = x, then the person whose credences
are represented by Cr is confident to x degree in p.
We’ll be interested in credences’ accuracy, i.e., their distance from the truth. The trouble is
that there are a number of ways of measuring distance from Cr(p) to 0 or 1, and the differences
between them are crucial. Call a method for measuring that distance a scoring rule. We’ll use ‘I ’
to denote the relevant scoring rule. We could, then, use the absolute value scoring rule: if p is true
and Cr(p) = x, I(x) = |1−x|; and if p is false, I(x) = |x|. Or we could use the Brier score: if p
is true, I(x) = 1− (1− x)2; and if p is false, I(x) = 1− x2. As we suggested, these scoring rules
have interestingly different properties, but they’ll only be relevant later. What’s important now is
that you can only compute expected accuracy relative to a way of measuring distance—a scoring
rule.
There’s another way of conceptualizing these inaccuracy measures, namely as epistemic utility
functions. We think that, just as an agent has a generic utility function—a function that determines
that, for her, getting a million dollars with no other relevant consequences is better than getting
just ten dollars—, agents also place value in believing truths and disvalue in believing falsehoods.
Scoring rules encode these values; they are epistemic utility functions. Moreover, we think that the
standard arguments for the two claims we mentioned in the introduction require this interpretation.
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That’s what we’ll try to establish now. Before we do, though, we should emphasize that we under-
stand there are objections to thinking of scoring rules this way; we just think that the philosophers
we discuss must conceive them this way, regardless.
The basic thought in epistemic decision theory is this: an agent is rationally required not to
ϕ just when there’s some incompatible “act” ψ such that ψ-ing is expectedly epistemically better
than ϕ-ing, where epistemic betterness at least in part depends on the accuracy that results from
ϕ-ing and ψ-ing. We’ll limit our epistemic “acts” to transitions between agents’ credence functions.
So, suppose we have some resultant credence function Cr that we want to evaluate. In that case,
the intuitive characterization still leaves two degrees of freedom, since we’re talking about expected
value.
More precisely, given a set S of possible states of the world and an agentS’s credence functionCr
and utility function U , the expected utility of ϕ-ing is EU(ϕ) =
∑
s∈S
U(s ∧ ϕ) · Cr(s).2 Similarly,
we can define the expected inaccuracy of S’s having credence x in p, given that she has a credence
of y in ¬p. Let ‘Ip’ mean ‘I given p’. Then the expected inaccuracy is EI(Cr(p) = x, I) =
Ip(x) · x+ I¬p(x) · y. We can now also give the following definition:
Definition 1. The overall expected inaccuracy of a credence function Cr relative to a scoring rule
I, EI(Cr∗, Cr, I), (where ‘Cr∗’ names the credences with which we evaluate the potential
epistemic act in question, and where ‘Cr’ names the credences that would result from that
potential epistemic act) is given by the following:∑
p∈P(W )
Ip(Cr(p)) · Cr∗(p) + I¬p(Cr(p)) · Cr∗(¬p).
So, first, we need a set of credences with which to calculate the expectation, and we also need an
(epistemic) utility function that is at least in part sensitive to accuracy. The only especially natural
choices as to those credences and utilities are the agent under evaluation and the theorist doing the
evaluating. So, consider the table below:
Agent’s credences, Agent’s utilities Agent’s credences, Evaluator’s utilities
Evaluator’s credences, Agent’s utilities Evaluator’s credences, Evaluator’s utilities
2Throughout, we use ‘ϕ’ to denote both the action, ϕ-ing, and the proposition that S ϕ-s interchangeably.
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In the top left, we get a very internalist kind of epistemic consequentialism: we calculate expected
epistemic value relative to the agent’s credences and epistemic utilities. This is the epistemic analogue
of standard decision theory. In the top right, we have a less internalist sort. Here, we calculate the
expected epistemic value relative to the agent’s credences and the theorist’s epistemic utilities. In
ethics, this corresponds to a special kind of subjective consequentialism: evaluating the agent’s
actions in light of the agent’s own credences, but with utilities as determined by the theorist.3 The
bottom-left corner is too weird to be relevant here (though there are some cases where we evaluate
this way). Finally, the bottom-right corner corresponds to a kind of objective consequentialism: it
evaluates actions by what are the “right” utilities (at least by the theorist’s lights).
Which version of epistemic decision theory you go in for should depend on what you want
to use the theory to do or to model. Just as there’s no context-neutral answer to whether decision
theory or consequentialism is “right”, there won’t be a context-neutral way of determining which
version of epistemic consequentialism is “right”, either. But for our own parts, we think that the
typical uses to which epistemic decision theory is put suggest the top-left corner, i.e., the analogue
of decision theory. That’s because we’re trying to say when an agent is rationally required to do or not
to do a given “act”, rather than when that “act” would in fact be best. Moreover, the most prominent
argument for requiring immodesty seems to depend on the top-left construal of epistemic decision
theory. Let us explain. First, we’ll give an informal characterization of immodesty, then a more
formal version, and finally the argument we just mentioned.
Informally, immodesty says that one ought not to expect (in the sense familiar from statistics)
one’s own credences to be less accurate than some other credence function. Suppose Cr uniquely
accurately represents S’s credences. Then S is (credally) modest when there’s some credence func-
tion Cr′ such that, according to Cr, Cr′ will be strictly more accurate than Cr; otherwise, S is
immodest. Slightly more formally:
Definition 2. Let Cr be S’s credence function, and I the epistemic utility function relevant for
evaluating S’s epistemic rationality. Then S is immodest iff there does not exist a credence
function Cr′ such that EI(Cr,Cr′, I) < EI(Cr,Cr, I); otherwise, S is modest.
That characterizes when an agent is immodest, but there is no normativity in that definition. We
3For this distinction, see, among others, Railton (1984).
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want some kind of requirement. How, exactly, the rational requirement to be immodest should be
formulated is a matter of (sometimes implicit) controversy. We’ll first give the prominent argument
for the requirement that we mentioned before, and then the requirement we think it motivates.
In a somewhat different context,4 Lewis (1971, p. 56) says the following: “Suppose you did
trust some non-immodest method. By definition, it estimates some competing method to be more
accurate than itself. So if you really did trust your original method, you should take its advice
and transfer your trust to one of the competing methods it recommends.” We can regiment this
argument as follows.5
P1. Where ϕ-ing and ψ-ing are epistemic acts, if the expected epistemic utility to S of S’s ϕ-ing
is strictly greater than S’s ψ-ing, and it is possible for S to ϕ, and S’s ϕ-ing is incompatible
with S’s ψ-ing, then S is (epistemically) rationally required not to ψ.
P2. IfCr is modest given S’s epistemic utility function I, then there’sCr′ such that the expected
epistemic utility to S of S’s having credences representable by Cr′ is strictly greater than S’s
having credences representable by Cr.
P3. It is possible for S to adopt credences representable by Cr′.
P4. S’s adopting credences representable by Cr′ is incompatible with S’s having credences rep-
resentable by Cr.
C. So, if Cr would make S modest, then S is (epistemically) rationally required not to have
credences representable by Cr.
Each premise is initially plausible; we’ll discuss them in turn.
With P1, we first need to clarify ‘epistemic act’. Minimally, it is sufficient for something to
be an epistemic act if it’s an adjustment or adoption of a degree of confidence in a proposition or
propositions. So, for example, making your credence higher that Al Franken will win an election
after viewing a debate will count as an epistemic act. That is, strictly, all we need to say for the
4“Somewhat different” because Lewis is evaluating “inductive methods”, i.e., functions from evidence to credences,
rather than credence functions in general. We believe that the intuition remains compelling when translated to the
present case.
5See also Gibbard (2007).
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argument to go through; we can leave the rest of the notion intuitive. Another example, however,
might prove important for later. Upon considering new evidence, one might suspend their judgment
in p, where we interpret this as choosing a credence function that is undefined for p.6
The justification of P1 is simple. It’s a maximizing principle, much like the familiar decision-
theoretic injunction to maximize one’s expected utility, given a set of choices that one can make.
The reasonableness of that principle should make P1 seem reasonable, too. But we would like to
emphasize that this is a substantive commitment; if you favor some different decision rules, e.g.,
minimax, you won’t find the requirement to be immodest even prima facie compelling. Because
we think that rules that enjoin maximizing expected utility are good ones, we won’t press this any
further.
P2 follows from the assumption that S is modest as a result of being representable by Cr.
P3 is perhaps themost obviously controversial of the premises. We have it and the corresponding
part of P1 because we know that there are some people who think that the rational ‘ought’ implies
some sort of ‘can’.7 We’re less sure that we need it. Even so, though we expect that this is a place
some people will resist the argument for immodesty, we will not ourselves focus on it.
P4 follows from the fact that an agent cannot have two (different) credence functions at once.
Cr and Cr′ must be different, since they have different expected epistemic utilities, given I. Of
course, it might be that one can have imprecise credences, where an imprecise credence function is a
set of credence functions—but this is just to say that the agent doesn’t have (isn’t representable by)
any precise credence function in particular.
We claim that the rational requirement to be immodest that this argument motivates comes to
this:
Immodesty. All agents are rationally forbidden from having credence functions and epistemic utility
functions that render that agent modest.
As we conceive of it, this is a wide-scope requirement. It says that a person ought not to have an
epistemic utility function and credence function that together conspire to render them immodest.
6This might not be the right analysis of suspension of judgment. See Friedman (2013) for discussion. For this
paper, we’re more interested in partial credence functions than suspension of judgment, at least if that analysis turns
out to be incorrect; we use the phrase ‘suspension of judgment’ merely for convenience.
7See, e.g., Wedgwood (2013).
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They can fix the problem by changing how they value truth and disvalue falsehood, or by changing
their credences. Of course, there might be other rational requirements that together entail that, say,
the Brier score is the rationally required epistemic utility function. But by itself, the requirement of
immodesty imposes no such strong constraints. This contrasts with some other formulations in the
literature. Joyce (2009), for example, says that the only admissible epistemic utility function with
which to (epistemically) evaluate an agent will be be ones that render that agent immodest in cases
where the agent’s credences are “clearly rational”. This doesn’t require that the agent herself have
that epistemic utility function. The problem is that if the agent doesn’t have the theorist’s epistemic
utility function, then they won’t necessarily be doing worse than they could by their own lights. A
version of the Lewis-Gibbard argument that didn’t tie the relevant epistemic utility functions to the
agent herself wouldn’t be plausible. This is because what is so compelling about the Lewis-Gibbard
argument is that the agent can see, by her own lights, that she has superior alternatives to her current
credence function. It is relatively uncontroversial that the agent’s own epistemic utility function is
relevant to the evaluation of “acts”; it is far more controversial, and requires independent argument,
to think that some theorist’s epistemic utility function matters for the evaluation of someone else.
So, for the Lewis-Gibbard argument to work using a different epistemic utility function than the
agent’s, we need a separate argument establishing that the theorist’s epistemic utility function is
normatively relevant for the agent under evaluation. But if the feature that makes the theorist’s
epistemic utility function normatively relevant is that it makes the agent’s credences immodest, the
Lewis-Gibbard argument would simply beg the question.
For these reasons, we will assume that agents have epistemic utility functions. The Lewis argu-
ment shows that at least one very prominent strain of epistemic decision theory conceives of it as an
internalist’s enterprise, and that enterprise only works at all if agents have epistemic utility functions
in the same way that agents have utility functions more generally. In the same way that an agent’s
desires—both their contents and their strengths—determine, likely not uniquely, a utility function,
we would like to say that an agent’s desires for believing truths and disbelieving falsehoods deter-
mine, likely not uniquely, an epistemic utility function. Their behavior will reveal these utilities,
at least in part: with respect to the truth, how risk averse or seeking are these agents? So, going
forward, we will assume just the same kind of realism about epistemic utilities that some decision
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theorists and ethicists assume about utility functions generally.
Another kind of argument for Immodesty is abductive: it shows that we can derive a lot of
desirable epistemic principles, so long as we can appeal to Immodesty. For example, Joyce (1998)
famously argues for probabilism (the requirement that credence functions be probability functions);
Greaves and Wallace (2006) and Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010) argue for conditionalization; and
Pettigrew (2016) argues for, among other principles, versions of the Principal Principle and the
Principle of Indifference. As we said, we’ll say why we don’t find this kind of argument compelling
in a later section.
Those are the major arguments for Immodesty; we’ll have more to say about them in a moment.
We now want to introduce the second, related claim. But first, we’ll need another bit of technology:
Definition 3. An epistemic scoring rule I is proper iff for all possible probability functions
Pr and finite sets of possibilities S, and every credence function Cr, EI(Pr, Pr, I) ≤
EI(Pr, Cr, I).8
Propriety. All admissible scoring rules for the evaluation of credence functions’ rationality are
proper.
Though Propriety (or strict propriety, see footnote 8) is widely taken to be motivated by Immodesty,
we think that is wrong. So, consider the following argument from Joyce (2009):
R1. No epistemic utility function I that is admissible for evaluating the rationality of epistemic
“acts” should render any credences modest when there are epistemic circumstances under
which those credences are clearly the rational ones to hold.
R2. Something like Lewis (1980)’s Principal Principle is correct, i.e., every agent S at t is rationally
required to be such thatCrS(p|Cht(p) = x) = x, where ‘Cht’ denotes the objective chance
function at t.
R3. For any probabilistically coherent credence function Cr, there is some possible chance func-
tion at a time, Cht and some agent S such that S learns that Cr = Cht.
8Most of the authors in this tradition use a stronger notion, strict propriety, where ‘<’ replaces ‘≤’ in our definition.
We think, withMayo-Wilson andWheeler (2016), that the Lewis-Gibbard argument clearly does not support strictness,
whatever it else it may support, since the existence of other equally good credence functions from an individual’s point
of view does not undermine the goodness of the individual’s own credences.
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R4. So, any probabilistically coherent credence function can be clearly the rational one to hold.
C. So, no epistemic utility function should render any person with probabilistically coherent
credences modest, i.e., all rationally permissible epistemic utility functions are improper.
It’s worth making the argument more intuitive. By definition, only proper epistemic utility func-
tions always render any probabilistically coherent agent immodest when evaluated using those utility
functions. The Principal Principle makes it rational to have any credence function that assigns the
same probabilities to the same propositions as the chance function does, when the agent learns what
the chance function is. Then, the argument claims, there are no restrictions on what probabilis-
tically coherent credence functions an agent might learn is identical with the chances at the time.
So, no probabilistically coherent function ought to be ruled impermissible simply by using a given
epistemic utility function. Thus, all epistemic utility functions that are acceptable to use to evaluate
credence functions’ rationality will be proper.9
R1 is a minimal constraint on epistemic utility functions; epistemic consequentialism would
simply not be plausible as a theory of epistemic rationality were R1 false. With R2, there’s room to
quibble about the proper form of the Principal Principle, since you might prefer Hall (1994)’s New
Principal Principle, or something similar. We’re confident the choice of the form it takes doesn’t
much affect whether the argument works. In any case, neither R1 nor R2 are where we will be
focusing our attention. R3 is intuitively plausible, since there don’t seem to be a priori restrictions
on what the chances at a given time could be.
Though this argument is, again, prima facie plausible, we think it pretty clearly fails. We have
three problems. They all target R3.
To see the first problem, note that there are probabilistically coherent credence functions that
satisfy the following: for some p, Cr(p|Cht(p) = x) ̸= x. They will not be credence functions
that the Principal Principle can rationalize; such a credence function cannot possibly be obtained
by learning what the objective chance function is for an agent who satisfies the Principal Principle.
So, they can (and should) be ruled out a priori. So, not every coherent credence function can be
made clearly rational for some agent by the Principal Principle, and so the argument fails.
9Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing us to clarify the statement of the Joyce argument.
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To be clear: we are giving an argument against R3, i.e., against the idea that any probabilis-
tic coherence functions might be the clearly rational ones to have. Here’s an oversimple example
demonstrating the general point: the agent assigns probability 1 to the proposition expressed by
‘Cht(p = 1), but assigns probability 0 to p and 1 to ¬p (and 1 to p ∨ ¬p, etc.). Assuming p is
the only atomic proposition in the agent’s algebra, such an agent is probabilistically coherent, but
obviously this credence function cannot be made rational by the Principal Principle. Of course, it
can be ruled as irrational—indeed, probably because it so grossly violates the Principal Principle
itself. But it is a counterexample to R3, because it is a probabilistically coherent credence function
that cannot be clearly the rational one to have, or at least cannot be because it is made so by the
Principal Principle. It shows that R3, and thus the Joycean argument for Propriety, fails. We said
the example was oversimple, by the way; it’s extreme. But because there are no logical connections
between chance propositions about p and p itself, there will be a good many examples like this,
many of which would be less extreme. More generally, we are not saying that there are no rational
restrictions on what epistemic utility functions an agent can have, or on the ones we can admissibly
use in rational evaluation of an agent’s credences. So, for all we have said, there might be good
reasons to rule out, say, the absolute value epistemic utility function. Here we are just concerned
to show that this argument for Propriety fails, because not every probabilistically coherent function
can be rationalized in the way the argument requires.10
Our other examples work similarly. So, here’s the second problem: there are Moore-like cases.
So, take the proposition that there are no doxastic states at t, where t is now. Either there are some
objective chances that this proposition can’t (now) have (e.g., 1), or it can have any objective chance,
but—for familiar Cartesian reasons—it wouldn’t be rational for any agent to be certain in it. There
are also, of course, more direct Moorean analogues, for example that it’s raining and I have very low
credence that it’s raining. Any of these would suffice to give examples of credence functions that
are notoriously coherent but irrational to have as one’s own. It’s important to note that these kinds
of Moorean credal assignments are what would be supported by the objective chance function via
10Propriety’s basic thought is that no probabilistically coherent function ought to be rationally disincentivized by one’s
epistemic utility function. Our rejection of this argument, then, amounts to this: that case has not been made. There
might be other ways to make it, but this very general way won’t work. In section 3 we will provide a general argument
for thinking that anything like Joyce’s argument here will fail, but here, our only aim was to attack premise R3, and
thereby Joyce’s argument. We thank an anonymous reviewer for helping us to clarify our response to Joyce’s argument.
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the Principal Principle. There could be facts about your neurophysiology that make it very likely
that you will have low credence in it raining in some cases where it is in fact raining. So, once
again, there are minimally coherent credence functions that cannot be rationalized in the way the
argument requires.
Here’s our last problem. It’s generally agreed that, where p’s truthmakers lie entirely before t,
Cht(p) = 0 or 1. So, p =<Abraham Lincoln was assassinated>. There is now no way to learn
that Cht(p) = x, where x is neither 0 nor 1. So, there is no way for the Principal Principle to
rationalize assigning non-extremal credence to p for agents like us. More generally, there is no
agent for which the Principal Principle can rationalize every coherent credence function, since for
any agent in worlds at all like ours, there will be propositions whose truthmakers lie entirely in the
past.
For all these reasons, we’re not optimistic about this argument’s chances. But it does highlight
some of the more important lessons that we take to be central to why Propriety is misguided. In
the next section, we’ll say what, exactly, we take these to be, so that a simple repair is not likely
forthcoming.
We think that this argument (R1, ...) hasn’t been put in its most general form. What’s really
required is some expert deference principle, and that need not be any form of the Principal Principle.
So, for example, if you treat Dumbledore as a guru, then you ought to satisfy something like this
constraint: CrS(p|CrD(p) = x) = x.11 And if you think Dumbledore could, in principle, have
any coherent credence function, then you get an argument with an identical structure. Moreover,
our first and third objections wouldn’t succeed against this argument. That’s not to say it doesn’t
have its own problems. First, the second objection still very much applies. Second, a version of the
first worry still applies, e.g., your learning that Dumbledore assigns x to p cannot rationalize the
coherent credence function where you thereby assign y ̸= x to p. Also, by being an epistemic agent,
rather than an abstraction, it becomes less plausible that the guru can justifiably have conditional
credences that violate certain evidentiary norms related to, for instance, induction. So, while we
think the generalization is worth pointing out and avoids some versions of some of these problems,
it doesn’t ultimately help.
11For discussion of this sort of terminology, see Elga (2007).
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So far our arguments have been pretty narrow, focusing only on rebutting Joyce’s argument for
Propriety. It’s worth worrying whether there is, nevertheless, a more general reason to go in for
Propriety: it is a way of guaranteeing that agents always satisfy Immodesty. But importantly, even if
an epistemic utility function is improper, that doesn’t mean that any and every credence function
an agent with that epistemic utility function has will render her modest. So there are other ways of
complying with Immodesty than by having a proper epistemic utility function. There is no simple
route even from Immodesty to Propriety. And, as we argued just now, there doesn’t seem to be a
complex one, either.
2 Rational Mistakes
Mistakes in an agent’s past can cause trouble down the line, both for the agent who has made
the mistakes and for the theorist trying to give recommendations for the agent’s beliefs. Suppose
our agent S has an update policy U , and in response to experience E fails to update her past cre-
dences CrS to the credences recommended by U , Cr∗S , instead adopting Cr′S . This might happen
as the result of a “glitch” in S’s cognitive functioning, or of some sort of doxastic or epistemic
akrasia—endorsing a doxastic or epistemic “act” but doing something else incompatible. Suppose
S is apprised of this—she realizes she failed to update by U . It seems it is permissible to simply
switch fromCr′S toCr∗S . Propriety does not allow this. Thus, Propriety is false. That is the argument
we will defend in this section.
In a little more detail, here it is:
S1. Suppose S has CrS at t and gets total evidence E at t′ > t, but fails to use the rationally
permissible update policy U that they endorse, and so has Cr′S at t′; S uses some other
updating procedure U ′.
S2. Suppose Cr∗S is what S’s credences would have been, had S used U rather than U ′.
S3. For all admissible I, at t′, EIS(Cr′S, Cr∗S, I) > EIS(Cr′S, Cr′S, I). (By Propriety.)
S4. So, it’s irrational for S to switch at t′′ > t′ from Cr′S to Cr∗S . (By epistemic utility theory.)
S5. But, it is rational for S to switch at t′′ from Cr′S to Cr∗S .
12
C. So, reductio, i.e., S3 is false.
There are important objections to consider to this argument.
The first points out that S3 uses a strict version of Propriety rather than the version we’ve mostly
been working with elsewhere in the paper. But note, first, that many authors use the strict version,
too. And either way, it would be a massive and unexplained coincidence if the relevant expected
inaccuracies were always equal. So we just ask you to restrict your attention to the cases in which
S3 is true, given S1 and S2.
According to the second objection, agents who realize they failed to update according to their
endorsed update policy U and are thus willing to switch their credences to what they would have
had had they used U don’t really have the credences we stipulated them to have.12 After all, they
don’t endorse them—that’s why they’re willing to switch!
Not endorsing credences as the right ones to have does not ensure that you don’t have those
credences. Epistemic akrasia is possible, e.g., cases in which one believes that one shouldnt be-
lieve p, but nevertheless does.13 We can be alienated from our credences in some sense. Compare
someone who is drunk who uses another person’s opinion about whether it’s safe for them to drive
home—it’s because the person doesn’t trust their high credence that it would be safe that they use
the other person’s credence. They might even say, “well, I still think I could drive home safely, but if
you’re so adamant about it...”. The situation we’re describing is not very unusual. There’s a lot more
to credence’s functional role than endorsement, or even bets, broadly construed—there’s also phe-
nomenology, verbal expression of that credence, etc. Sometimes we correctly attribute credences
on the basis of those other factors.
The third objection is easiest to understand if U is standard conditionalization, i.e., the update
rule according to which, when their posterior credences are Cr and between t and t′, E is the
strongest thing the agent learns, then their posterior credences Cr′ must be such that, for all p,
Cr(p|E) = Cr′(p). Now, suppose the agent uses U ′ rather than conditionalization (for whatever
reason). If it’s rational to switch upon realizing that, then don’t they have new evidence that they
12Thanks to [removed].
13That doesn’t mean it’s rational to have such credences. See Horowitz (2014), Greco (2014), and Lasonen-Aarnio
(2015) for some discussion. We note, though, that even for those those who think it is irrational, surely it is so only
after some unspecified and unspecifiable period of time in which one can correct those beliefs.
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can thereby conditionalize on? That would not violate Propriety.14 This objection would work if
every agent were rationally required to have credences prior to the realization thatCr′(p|cr∗〈t,t′〉(p) =
x) = x, where cr∗〈t,t′〉 non-rigidly denotes the credence function that they would have at t′ had they
conditionalized on the strongest thing they learned between t and t′. The agent must be required
to have these conditional credences prior to the realization rather than after it, since otherwise
changing the conditional credences to reflect that would again violate Propriety. So this objection
requires that agents who endorse conditionalization must have those conditional credences.
The trouble is we cannot see a motivation for this requirement. It does not follow from the
thought that conditionalization is the uniquely rationally acceptable doxastic update policy. More
importantly, an agent might never have considered the situation in which they fail to conditionalize
properly. If they do find that they failed to conditionalize properly, then perhaps they are then
rationally required to have those conditional credences and then conditionalize on them, all at once
as it were. That won’t help, for the reason gave in the previous paragraph. So requiring these
conditional credences requires agents to foresee situations that they needn’t be rationally required
to foresee.
According to the fourth objection, Propriety is an idealization. Based on what we’ve said so far,
this can be fleshed out in two different ways. First, we can say that it is only meant to apply to
agents who have not made past epistemic mistakes. In that case, it’s easy to see how our argument
wouldn’t apply. Second, we can say that agents who endorse conditionalization are required to have
those prior conditional credences, since they are more ideal than ordinary agents, and so we can
assume certain powers of foresight of them that we can’t of normal agents.
Of course, we have no problemwith idealization as such. We do, however, think that these kinds
of idealizations would significantly narrow the range of cases to which epistemic decision theory or
consequentialism is meant to apply. Insofar as the results they can offer are theoretically desirable
rational requirements, we would like to be able to say that they rationally constrain normal agents,
too. So idealizing is not without cost. More to the point, though, we think there are problems with
Propriety even as it applies to pretty strongly idealized agents. In the next section, we’ll explain.
14Thanks to [removed] for raising this worry.
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3 Epistemic and Practical Decision Theory
Propriety becomes especially implausible when you start thinking about what its analogue for prac-
tical decision theory would be. Doing so will also reveal the extreme idealizations that would be
necessary to save it.
By “practical decision theory”, we just mean the line of decision theories descended from Ram-
sey, embodied in Savage (1972), Jeffrey (1965), and Joyce (1999). Unsurprisingly it resembles
epistemic decision theory in its basic ingredients: it uses the agent’s credences and utilities to form
expected values of various options, and then it recommends agents select only top-ranked options.
The details and intramural conflicts between various ways to develop the theories aren’t important
for us. First, consider the following definition:
Definition 4. A utility function U is practically proper iff for each possible intention I to ϕ that
S might have, for each probabilistically coherent credence function CrS , and for each of S’s
options ψ, EVU,CrS(ϕ) ≥ EVU,CrS(ψ), where EV is the expected value function of the
correct decision theory.
According to Definition 4, a utility function is practically proper just when, no matter what in-
tention the agent adopts, that intention could not help but maximize expected utility so long as
they also have a coherent credence function. So, a utility function is not proper merely if, relative
to it, all actual intentions an agent has maximize expected utility; rather, as we said, it must make
it that all possible intentions an agent might have do so. It is, in other words, simply the practical
analogue of Definition 3. With that said, consider now how implausible the following practical
analogue of Propriety is:
Practical Propriety. All admissible utility functions for the evaluation of intentions’ rationality are
practically proper.15
We think Practical Propriety is quite mistaken, and the reason is clear: even people with probabilistic
credence functions would sometimes fail to maximize in light of those credence functions, given
15Thanks to a reviewer for pressing us to be clearer on exactly what Practical Propriety comes to.
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utilities that are mandated by their intrinsic desires.16 One reason, of course, is computational: we
don’t expect agents to be good at calculating the very complex magnitudes involved.17 But such
computational limits are really not the point we wish to raise, since it’s pretty natural to idealize
them away. The problem is more fundamental: we wish to use practical decision theory’s rational
injunctions in part to criticize those who do not comply with it by maximizing expected utility,
and enjoin those who do not currently intend what would maximize their expected utility to do
so. It’s true that there’s a traditional way of thinking about those decision theories that also runs
through Ramsey, Savage, and Jeffrey, of thinking that there is no independent, or no theoretically
important independent, reality to an agent’s credences and utilities. But this genre of interpretation
is unsatisfying for just the reason we just gave.18 More basically, we just do have intrinsic desires
and confidences. They might not have quite the structure we’d like credence or utility functions
to model, but that is a different claim entirely. We’ll assume, then, that it is possible for agents to
have credences, utilities, and intentions such that the intention the agent actually forms is of less
expected value than some other act they know they could intend. That by itself contravenes Practical
Propriety. The most fundamental reason is, as we said, that we would like to criticize agents who do
not maximize expected utility (and, so, those who do not minimize expected inaccuracy). But how
might this happen for actual agents, or even relatively, but not completely, idealized agents?
One factor is sheer laziness. This is distinct from computational intractability. Suppose there
are just two options, A and B, which differ only in that A is F and B is ¬F . And suppose the
relevant agent knows their utilities (and, if you like, their credences) perfectly well. They might still
decide that it’s not worth the trouble to compute the expected value of A as opposed to B. Then
they might intend A, even though B in fact has more expected utility. You might worry that the
options are not properly described: really they’re A with calculation, B with calculation, A without
calculation, and B without calculation; and either A or B without calculation is clearly superior to
A or B with calculation—though how much would, of course, be impossible to know in a way that
16It’s important that we are criticizing Practical Propriety and not a practical analogue of Immodesty. The reason
is that a practical analogue of Immodesty is just the normative requirement to maximize expected utility. We think
that might be a correct normative principle. Our issue with Practical Propriety is that we don’t think it’s a functional
constraint on admissible utility functions that they necessarily render every probabilistically coherent agent practically
immodest. Thanks to a reviewer for pressing us here.
17See, e.g., Feldman (2006).
18For more discussion of these points, see Meacham and Weisberg (2011) and Easwaran (2014).
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retains genuine optionality. Perhaps, though we think people often forego calculation where it is
expectedly more beneficial than not calculating. This might be a sort of akrasia; if so, it is a very
common kind. Indeed, akrasia of a more general kind can cause (or constitute) our intending a less
good outcome in expectation.
Not just akrasia does that, though. Agents sometimes accept decision rules besides ones that
enjoin them to maximize expected utility. This choice itself might be irrational,19 and it might cause
them to make subsequent irrational choices down the line. But surely it is possible. So if we would
like to offer rational criticism of those people for these reasons, then we should not accept Practical
Propriety. It should be possible to criticize an agent for failing to maximize expected utility relative
to their actual utilities, while allowing that those utilities are rationally acceptable.
Finally, an agent might simply not know what their utilities are. For example, you might get
excellent evidence that you intrinsically desire something: for example, knowledge of number the-
ory. But then you try it, and you realize you never actually wanted it; you thought you did, because
people you admired wanted it, and you thought, and perhaps hoped, you were like them, as you
knew you were in many other respects. Failure to know our own desires is unfortunately common,
and not at all always a mistake of rationality: our evidence is sometimes misleading, just as evidence
is about anything else. So, we would misevaluate people if we required that rational agents’ util-
ity functions always have them maximizing expected utility. Now, perhaps this is a problem with
practical decision theory; perhaps it’d be more reasonable to go with a kind of “expected expected
utility” theory.20 We remain neutral. What’s important is that this is just yet another way a person
might fail to maximize expected utility theory, even with an admissible utility function. And it
seems like idealizing this way is a very large idealization; why shouldn’t rationally ideal agents be
able to be misled about what they want?
So, Practical Propriety is untenable, since we would like to criticize lazy agents, akratic agents,
and perhaps also agents that accept incorrect decision rules; and we would like it to be possible for
agents with acceptable utility functions to not maximize expected utility because they are misled as
to what those utility functions are. The important point here is that analogues of all of these will
apply in the epistemic case, too. Epistemic agents can be lazy, akratic, accept bad epistemological
19For the thought that it is irrational, see Titelbaum (2015).
20See, e.g., Boutilier (2003).
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principles, and fail to know their epistemic utility functions. In other words, exactly the same
reasons for denying Practical Propriety should lead us to reject Propriety. Epistemic decision theory
is not all that structurally different from practical decision theory; its concerns are simply limited
to a very specific kind of utility, and very specific kinds of “acts” (epistemic ones).
Here, then, is the structure of our argument. Immodesty and Propriety typically have internalist
justifications, much like principles of decision theory. That means that we should give to epistemic
utility functions roughly the same amount of psychological reality as we do to more general utility
functions of the kind used in practical decision theory. But when we do this, we find that Propriety is
wrong for the same reasons Practical Propriety is wrong: agents can genuinely have a given rationally
admissible epistemic utility function and still fail tomaximize expected utility (orminimize expected
inaccuracy). The internalist motivations such principles must receive falsify those principles.
4 PracticalDecisionTheory andEthics, EpistemicDecisionThe-
ory and Epistemology
We think there is a more general lesson to be learned from this discussion. We said in our intro-
duction that philosophers have used ‘epistemic decision theory’ and ‘epistemic consequentialism’
to refer to the same project. But clearly ‘decision theory’ and ‘consequentialism’ refer to quite dif-
ferent projects. A person might fully comply with decision theory’s recommendations while being
a morally terrible person. This is not so with any correct ethical theory.21 Decision theory is, by
design, much less substantive than ethical theory. This is what gives rise to its generally internalist
character, since its recommendations are meant to make sense given arbitrary, or almost arbitrary,
points of view; not so for consequentialism. A similar distinction, we think, captures the difference
between epistemic decision theory and epistemology, at least as we propose now to use those terms.
Here’s a different way to put these points. It’s no problem for decision theory if it recommends
that a serial killer kill; it very much would be an at least prima facie problem if ethical theories
delivered that result in normal cases. The point is just that decision theory is radically internalist:
it takes credence functions and utility functions for granted—modulo certain consistency require-
21Thanks to a reviewer for getting us to clarify what we meant here.
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ments, such as, perhaps, transitivity of preference22—and then gives recommendations on that basis.
Ethics has some further jobs to do. It can, for example, filter out unacceptable utility functions.
Or, it can make some options ineligible independent of what the expected utility calculations rec-
ommend, even given otherwise acceptable utility functions. For an example of the kind, it might be
that deriving a lot of utility from the pain of others is ethically impermissible. If, on the other hand,
you think mental states like desire aren’t the province of ethics, then you can say that regardless of
whether the utilities themselves are acceptable or not, causing others pain for no other reason is
impermissible. Importantly, though, neither is the job of decision theory, which is neutral about
what the options are and what the good utility functions are.23
There’s an analogous distinction between epistemic decision theory and epistemology, we think.
The burden of this section will be to convince you of that. As we said, decision theory is, at its very
heart, internalist. This means that its recommendations have to be something that speak to the
agents themselves, as their points of view in fact work. If a theorist thinks some option would
be better for them, but if there’s no route from the agent’s actual coherent credences and utilities
to that option, then the theorist’s view is of no consequence as far as decision theory goes. We
should emphasize that we are not committing ourselves to reasons internalism,24 or even, necessarily,
internalism about rationality. This is just how we think the project of decision theory ought to
be delineated. And at first glance, epistemic decision theory seems to respect this, at least more
than any other epistemic theory that we?ve seen, at least as traditionally understood. For one, its
recommendations are formed by taking expectations of credences and (epistemic) utilities. That is a
real and important similarity. Also, the Lewis argument has a decidedly internalist feel. But, as we’ve
seen, the theory is not internalist enough. And there are different ways in which it isn’t internalist
enough, depending on certain choices the theorist might make. Some epistemic decision theorists
have imposed on individuals epistemic utilities that, not only do they not have, but they seem not to
be rationally required to have, either—such as the proper utility functions. But as we saw, even that’s
22More on this as it applies to our argument against thinking of epistemic decision theory as epistemology in a
moment.
23We are aware of some people who try to derive ethics from decision theory (or at least from game theory), like
Gauthier (1986), but we are convinced that that cannot be done. If you do think it can, however, you’ll be far less
interested in the distinction we make in this section, but we think sufficiently many people share our suspicion to
motivate what we’ll say.
24See Williams (1981).
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not enough, because the agent can fail to be aware of their own epistemic utilities, even in broad
outline. Internalist motivations cannot deliver anything like Propriety. And they shouldn’t, because
nothing like Propriety is true in the practical case: it would be unreasonable to assume even relatively
ideal agents always succeed in matching their intentions to the theory’s recommendations.25 So,
even if Propriety can allow the epistemic decision theorist to make the intuitively correct epistemic
criticisms of agents who, say, have non-probabilistic credence functions, we just don’t think that’s
the theory’s job, any more than we think decision theory should allow us to criticize coherent killers
and sadists.
Of course, coherence matters even in decision theory, you might think. Money pump argu-
ments certainly seem and are often taken to establish that agents ought to have transitive preferences.
We suspect that really these are motivated as modeling assumptions, or as adequacy constraints on
a theory that can actually recommend behavior, but either way, our problem is not with probabil-
ism, even as a constraint on input credences to an epistemic decision theory. Rather, our problem
is with using internalist arguments to motivate a derivation of probabilism with Propriety. So, we’re
not against coherence constraints, even the ones that epistemic decision theorists have argued for;
we just think their arguments are not motivated by epistemic decision theory, but if the constraints
are good, they need independent motivation.
So, what’s left of epistemic decision theory without Propriety? Well, what’s left is just the epis-
temic analogue of decision theory. It won’t give as many structural constraints as we might have
hoped for, but we didn’t hope for similar constraints in the practical case for good reason: decision
theory is very much a garbage in, garbage out kind of a theory. We’re advocating seeing epistemic
decision theory in the same way; we think that’s what the project’s motivations deliver, and that
anything else is too substantive. This means that epistemic decision theory is not, as some have
seemed to hope, a replacement for epistemology, any more than practical decision theory is a re-
placement for ethics. But just as many doubt the derivation of ethics from decision or game theory,
25A reviewer objects: this looks like a criticism of a practical analogue to Immodesty rather than of Practical Propriety,
because it looks like our criticism is of agents’ actual choices rather than their utility functions. But this appearance is
a little misleading. Our concern is that it be possible to criticize agents for failing to maximize expected utility, which
is made impossible by requiring for the evaluation of agents’ intentions practically proper utility functions. So our
criticism is, in the first instance, of a requirement on utility functions, though it is true that that criticism derives from
our wish to criticize intentions or choices. Recall from footnote 14 that we think the practical analogue of Immodesty,
conceived of as a rational or normative requirement on (now) credence-utility-intention triples, might very well be
right. We thank the reviewer for this objection.
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we doubt the derivation of epistemology from decision theory. We wish to emphasize that we don’t
think we should simply take every agent’s actual epistemic utility function for granted—there are
almost certainly substantive, rational requirements on those utility functions that a person might
fail to conform to. But, we do think that these constraints ought somehow to be internalistically
motivated. We take no issue with the part of epistemic decision theory that meets those demands.
In particular, there might be rational constraints on epistemic utility functions that correspond to
transitivity and independence in practical decision theory. We thus do not reject the epistemic
decision theorists’ approach to accuracy measures in every particular; our target is the extremely
popular Propriety. In epistemology, by contrast, it is an open and much debated question whether
epistemic constraints must be internalistically motivated.
There are other advantages to our way of thinking. For example, we think that this way of
thinking about things allows us to avoid some problems that have proved very difficult for epistemic
decision theorists recently. First, there’s the notorious problem of epistemic bribes.26 So, take the
following case:
Converted scientist. Clara is an atheist scientist who seeks a grant from a religious organization.
The grant agency will only give grants to fund Christians’ research, and Clara knows that she
wouldn’t be able to fool them. Despite the fact that she’s thought long and hard about the
issue and knows that, on balance, the evidence strongly supports atheism over Christianity,
she also knows that this will cause her belief set to be filled with more accurate beliefs than
she had before that.
The epistemic decision theorist who aspires to epistemology will have a hard time with this case,
because she will recommend that Clara believe in the Christian God, which is standardly taken to
be the wrong result. But our epistemic decision theorist need say no such thing; she can say that,
although the true epistemological theory would say that in her evidential position Clara ought not
to believe in God, she would get more of what she epistemically wants by doing so. So Converted
scientist would no longer be a counterexample, nor would the rest of the epistemic bribe cases. This
is similar to how an ethical theory might have deontological restrictions that would be out of place
in a decision theory.
26See, e.g., Firth (1998), Berker (2013), Greaves (2013), and Konek and Levinstein (forthcoming).
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More generally, the epistemic decision theorist need not worry about attacks based on eviden-
tialism, namely the theory that an agent epistemically ought to fit their credences to the evidence,
however that’s to be spelled out exactly.27 So, it would avoid problems based on evidentialism
that already exist in the literature even assuming Propriety,28 and problems with evidentialism that
arise from having improper epistemic utility functions. That is, when an agent has an improper
epistemic utility function, our version of epistemic decision theory will, in some cases depending
on the exact function, recommend changing credences but not in response to any new evidence.
So, for example, the absolute value epistemic utility function recommends extremal credences in
all propositions to which one does not initially give 0.5 credence. But this is again no problem if
switching credences in that way is bad by epistemology’s lights, even if it secures more of the agent’s
own epistemic good, at least by their own lights.
Finally, the epistemic decision theorist can give no reason to rule out the following probabilis-
tically coherent priors: .99 to some contingent p conditional on every proposition q. We’re not
absolutely positive epistemology should rule those out, but we do think epistemic decision theory
can’t, and so anyone who thinks that epistemology can be derived exclusively by using epistemic
decision theory cannot rule those out as epistemically bad. This is just the same as the situations we
began by describing: decision theory can’t tell agents not to prefer not killing, but ethics might be
able to. So, we have yet another reason to distinguish epistemic decision theory and epistemology.
We suspect there are many other reasons, but we think we’ve made our case. The internalist
motivations for epistemic decision theory fit terribly with what it has been used for so far. Moreover,
the analogy with practical decision theory should lead us to expect that there is a difference between
epistemic decision theory and epistemology. Finally, we can avoid or dissolve some problems that
have seemed intractable for epistemic decision theory as it’s been practiced. That is, once again, not
to say that the results the epistemic decision theorist has argued for cannot be right, only that they
ought not to be argued for in that way.
27See, e.g., Feldman and Conee (1985).
28See, e.g., Easwaran and Fitelson (2012).
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